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Functions and failures. 
How to manage technological promises for societal challenges 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Technological promises are becoming part of the way in which scientific and 
technological communities try to attract the attention of stakeholders, aiming at legitimation, 
reputation, and funding. Not all promises, however, become reality. With the increase in the 
use of promises comes the risk of disillusion and cynicism, which may affect negatively 
policy makers and the public opinion. The paper suggests the introduction in the field of S&T 
and innovation policy of a tool commonly used in engineering fields, aimed at identifying and 
measuring all possible failures of a proposed technology. Instead of focusing on the magnitude 
of promises, it suggests that a useful perspective can be gained by placing systematic attention 
to the negative side, i.e. all reasons why a given technology may fail to deliver the promises. 
The paper develops the methodology, presents a case study, and illustrates the benefits of 
using it in policy making. 
Keywords: technology foresight; functional analysis; FMECA.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The idea that technologies are crucial ingredients for addressing problems that plague modern 
societies has been accepted since long time. However, with the acceleration of technological 
progress, and particularly after the emergence of technologies of information, materials and life, 
this belief has been associated with rising expectations and with the purposeful management of 
technological promises by scientists and technologists. 
As an interesting stream of literature in sociology of technology has recently emphasized (Brown 
and Michael, 2003; Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003; Borup et al., 2006; Sung and Hopkins; 2006), 
proponents of new technologies have learnt how to manage the expectations of society, building 
compelling narratives about the promises of current developments that mobilize social and political 
support and help to ensure public funding. This literature has showed that, in some sense, the 
building of promises is endogenous to the unfolding of technologies, so that the social construction 
of promises and the actual, material development of technological achievements are mutually 
determined. They develop through cycles of legitimation, construction of promises, social support, 
public and private funding, technology development- but also, and more often than expected, 
disappointment. Therefore creating high expectations is a double-edge sword: on one hand, it may 
help to mobilize more support, raise more money and accelerate the delivery of promises; on the 
other hand, the higher the expectations, the stronger the disappointment should the delivery fall 
short of them. Even worse, the disappointment on poor delivery of technology may feed back 
adversely on society, since the next promises may be addressed with a more cynical attitude. 
These issues have become even more crucial because many governments have started to base their 
S&T policies on the notion of societal challenges- a theme that underlies both the recent US policy 
towards energy and sustainability proposed by President Obama, the European Union Green Paper 
approved in 2011 and the ambitious plan Europe 2020. 
This paper addresses these issues from a quite technical, but hopefully useful, perspective, by 
reversing the point of view commonly adopted. Instead of focussing on what can be achieved with 
technologies, or on the delivery of new functions that address societal challenges, we suggest to 
focus also on failures - how it is possible that the new solutions fail to deliver their promise.  
A systematic analysis of failures requires a structured approach, for which we advocate the 
adaptation to the context of S&T policies of a method originally developed and largely used in 
engineering, called FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis). The paper discusses a full-fledged 
case study of failure analysis of a new technology, and offers suggestions on how to use this 
approach on a large scale in a policy context. 
 
2. Technological promises, hype cycles and the danger of excess expectations 
 
In recent years, several scholars started to investigate the role of technological promises. A promise 
is, by definition, a projection into the future of a desired state of affairs, associated to a commitment 
to deliver this state. Scientists and technologists make a promise when they claim that, if their 
research is adequately funded, their discoveries will deliver some specified benefit to society. Such 
promises are not generic - gene therapy will address diseases for which there is currently no known 
solution, or nanotechnology will bring new materials that make solar energy cheap and clean. 
The tendency to shift to the future the realization of desires is considered an integral part of the 
experience of modernity, while visions of the future carry with them expectations of improvements 
in the material conditions of people (Koselleck, 2004).  
However, in the case of science and technology, more than in other spheres of human history, the 
visions of the future have a powerful effect on the present. In the case of technological promises, in 
fact, the projection into the future may be self-fulfilling. In trying to influence the vision of the 
future held by society, scientists and technologists may obtain more resources and actually 
determine the course of technology. This is even more so when technologies are new, because of 
the “deeply fluid character of new emerging technologies in their first stages” (Van Merkerk et al., 
2005). Thus what retrospectively may appear as a linear and deterministic development of the 
technology is instead the result of a complex interplay between technological expectations, 
purposefully fostered by technological promises, and the internal dynamics of technology. As the 
literature on technological determinism has shown, retrospective interpretations tend to obscure the 
role of earlier representations, i.e. promises and expectations, in shaping technology (Roe Smith and 
Marx, 1994). 
 
However, while technological promises may build up representations of the future that help to raise 
more resources, there is also the possibility of excess promises, or promises that do not materialize 
even in a state of abundant resources. If this is the case, the promise produces perverse effects.  
As pointed out by Borup et al. (2006), “expectations and the frequent disappointments to which 
they lead are accompanied by serious costs in terms of reputations, misallocated resources and 
investment”. In general, disappointment is a function of the distance between the promise (or the 
expectation) and the realization. Pushing technological promises high may result in larger 
disappointment in the future.  
Yet, the tendency to commit to important promises seems to be an integral part of the dynamics of 
scientific and technological communities.  
In the field of nanotechnology, Maestrutti (2011) has offered an impressive reconstruction of the 
way in which a new technology becomes legitimated, referring to authoritative pioneering sources, 
while technological promises are constructed using grand visions and prophecies. She shows how 
technological promises, embedded into these visions of the future, have been systematically used to 
leverage consensus and funding. At the same time, the same visions of the future may paradoxically 
generate fears, negative reactions and irrational behavior, as it happens when the themes of invisible 
worlds, manipulation of the body at nanoscale, or even immortality, are proposed. 
The literature discussed above seems to suggest that, if the dynamics of promises and expectations 
is left to itself, it tends to generate cycles of hype and disappointment. In the long run, this may 
threaten the credibility of scientific and technological communities and make the dialogue with 
society more difficult. 
Brown and Michel (2003) suggested that this effect might come from the tendency of scientists and 
technologists to ignore, or underestimate, the degree to which the delivery of promises depends also 
on human behaviour, or more generally, on the interaction and co-evolution between technology 
and society. 
Therefore, there is clearly a need for developing methods aimed at mitigating the possibility of 
disappointment and negative reactions.   
3. How to manage technological promises: methods and gaps 
 
It is not our goal to offer a full-scale review of methods, but only to highlight some recent directions 
of the literature and to identify gaps. 
The first area of methods has been developed under the broad category of technology foresight. 
Here recent developments are participative and networking methods that try to involve prospective 
users of technologies in the foresight and policy building process. These developments were 
pioneered in the 1990s by the so-called Constructive Technology Assessment (Rip et al., 1995). 
Such approach was intended to “anticipate on societal aspects in an early stage of technological 
developments to get better societal embedded technology” (van Merkerk et al., 2005). More recent 
developments include scenario workshops, groupware, semantic tools to analyse user requirements 
(e.g. mindmapping), and various deliberative tools. The main direction here is to transform 
technology foresight into a social process, rather than using it as an expert support to high level, 
relatively insulated, policy decisions. However, “increasingly sophisticated methodologies of 
futures analysis and planning may be hard to integrate with more participative activities” (Miles et 
al., 2008). 
Participation of prospective users, if not managed appropriately, may even worsen the technology 
promise cycle, because it may lead to unrealistic and exaggerated expectations. Since technological 
scenarios are produced with the validation of users, their disappointment may be even larger.  
As stated by a European Commission Expert Group (2010): “The point is that simply “asking 
society” is not adequate. When asked, society does not tell you what you need to drive policies. 
There is often a naïf argument in recent debates, according to which consultative, open, bottom up 
methods of society involvement into technology policy making are the solution. There is still a gulf 
between what society asks, and what should be done in technology and innovation policy making 
[…]. By contrasting to the military complex or the notion of user-innovation proposed by von 
Hippel (e.g. von Hippel, 2005), this Report calls the attention to the fact that technology and society 
speak very different languages, and simply putting them into relation is not an adequate solution.” 
 
Other fields in which the issue of technological promises has been recently addressed include 
scientometrics and technometrics. In the former, a crucial question is whether a given scientific 
development has a potential for generating technological opportunities in the short-medium term, or 
rather whether it is oriented towards fundamental understanding of natural processes. Jovanovic 
(2007) developed a method, called Footprint Analysis, which combines the analysis of the nature of 
the institutions that publish paper or grant patents (e.g. academic research, companies), with the 
allocation of substantive matters into one of the four quadrants of the Stokes matrix (Stokes, 1997). 
In the latter field, a recent example of the implications of long term technological decisions aimed 
at addressing societal needs can be found in sustainable mobility. There is still significant 
uncertainty over the relative advantages of hydrogen, fuel cell, and electric propulsion for vehicles. 
In this area the role of technological promises has been enormous, since proponents of respective 
technologies have used the argument of societal challenges in order to obtain funding. Based on 
patent analysis and industry specialization analysis, Beaudet et al. (2010) have argued that Europe 
has over-invested in fuel cell technology, while Japan has invested heavily in battery technology, 
benefitting from spillover from the consumer electronics industry, and is better placed to exploit the 
expected transition to electric vehicles based on batteries. 
 
Third, new methods have been proposed to manage social conflicts. In this direction, Hard (1993) 
developed the notion that innovation is intrinsically divisive, so that it is pointless to look for 
methods that give a consensual view of the future. Rather, it is important to identify the conflicts 
that new technologies will bring about, and to manage them. More recently, Sung and Hopkins have 
developed a method to define the uncertainty associated to technological promises. Uncertainty 
depends on the potential conflict between frames adopted by different social groups, and on the 
difference between past experiences and future expectations (Sung and Hopkins, 2006). 
 
Let us examine some weaknesses of the current toolbox. 
First of all, in advocating the need to combine technical expertise and social involvement, existing 
methods underestimate the difference in languages between experts and lay people. It is not enough 
to open a dialogue between these communities, if there is not adequate methodology to translate the 
languages and make the two parts understand each other. Moreover, mastering a language means to 
exert power over a certain domain, and no social group accepts to give up its own language without 
something in exchange. This may require the development of a language, which is not owned by 
any specific group, but rather a lingua franca. Although these limitations are clearly understood by 
the technology assessment community, there is surprising little research in trying to address the 
language and associated power issues. 
 
Second, existing methods do not demand a deep engagement into the substantive content of 
technology. This may be understood as a demand for parsimony: at the end of the day, it is not 
realistic to require that in order to design and manage S&T policies the specificities of fields of 
scientific research and domains of technology are mastered. Nevertheless, understanding at least the 
basic aspects of research is fundamental in order to effectively deal with it.  
There is a need to infuse more technical content inside existing methodologies. Participatory 
methods that produce broad scenarios and storyboards, or use visual techniques based on 
ethnographic design methods provide a useful starting point, but they should be integrated with 
methods that have a closer relation to the technical content. This remark is also consistent with the 
criticism by Könnölä et al. (2007), who note that the open-ended consultation of stakeholders tends 
to produce “relatively unstructured pools of ‘signals’”. 
Therefore the challenge is to develop methods that can be managed by both experts and 
stakeholders, add information to the process, and help to face the uncertainty associated to new 
technologies. 
We suggest the adaptation to the management of technological promises of techniques originally 
developed in engineering. In the next sections we first introduce the notion of function and of  
Functional Analysis; second, we describe failures, and the technique called FMECA is advocated as 
a powerful tool to examine technological promises; finally, a case study is presented. 
 
 
4. Address functions, not only performance. A short introduction to Functional Analysis 
 
In suggesting technological promises, communities of scientists and technologists usually refer to 
the expected performance of future technologies. In many cases the promised performance is 
associated to quantitative measures, so that several competitive technologies can be compared 
systematically. The emphasis on performance is understandable since it is associated to the promise 
to address and solve concrete issues: cure for diseases, clean energy and so on. 
Furthermore, it is clear that many technological promises are not fulfilled because of performance 
issues, including the highly relevant dimension of cost. For example, the promise of RFID 
technology of providing a large-scale support in logistics is far from being achieved due to the 
inability of such technology to reduce manufacturing costs significantly. At a broader systemic 
scale, technological promises may fail due to the inability to provide complementary technologies, 
or to arrange for supply chain, logistics and after sales services appropriately. 
 
However, an exclusive focus on performance has two negative implications. First, the emphasis on 
performance inhibits a full-scale consideration of potential technological alternatives. They are only 
considered at the beginning, and then disregarded in the course of technology development. 
Second, it locks the dialogue between society and technology. Faced with the promise of delivering 
a given performance, it seems that there is no further room for interaction: what is needed is only to 
fund research adequately, and wait. Thus the emphasis on performance results in passivization of 
society. Consideration of systemic effects of technology and of interaction with users and their 
social context tends to be overlooked, or postponed at a later, implementation stage. 
Consequently, we suggest that focusing on performance is not the appropriate way to manage 
technological promises and to establish a dialogue between scientific communities and 
stakeholders. Rather, we propose that the appropriate level of analysis is the abstract function of a 
technology, and the appropriate language is then the functional language.  
In a classical engineering approach (Pahl and Beitz, 1984) each function is defined as an “operation 
on flows” and it is represented using a verb+object form. The verb describes the action (the 
operation) that can be performed on three fundamental types of objects (flows): material, energy 
and signal. A function is an abstract description of the behavior of an artifact in a given context of 
use, which is also informative about the overall reasons for the artifact itself. 
To describe functions, however, a language that makes abstraction from any specific technical 
solution is needed. This turns out to be quite difficult, since a good functional description must 
encompass all technical solutions (existing or potential), but at the same time must be 
comprehensible for the users. Luckily enough, recent developments in the literature make new 
functional languages reasonably user-friendly. 
 
Many research works have been aimed at the definition of standardized taxonomies of all the 
possible functions and flows, resulting both in large databases (Bonaccorsi and Fantoni 2007) or 
restricted sets (Hirtz et al. 2002, Fantoni et al. 2009). Among the latter, the so-called Reconciled 
Functional Basis (Hirtz et al. 2002) has become one of the most widely accepted, although some 
critical remarks (Vermaas 2007), additions (Ahmed and Wallace 2003) and further refinements 
(Fantoni et al., 2009) have been proposed. These databases offer a rich language, which can be used 
to construct formally correct functional descriptions at any level of resolution, and for many 
technological fields. 
Without entering in an in-depth discussion about the concept of function (see Fantoni et al. 2011 for 
further details), the notion of function assumed in this paper is that functions are nothing other than 
the result of the user’s interpretative process about the product’s physical behaviors, conditioned by 
the goal he wants to achieve. 
Such formulation underlines both the cognitive aspects of a function and the physical level related 
to the object’s behavior. Functions capture the main purpose of existence of a product together with 
its essential characteristics and therefore they constitute a powerful tool to represent and study 
artifacts and technologies. 
Indeed, Functional Analysis (FA) has proven extremely useful in many fields of engineering design, 
from the conceptual design of new products to the mapping and sharing of knowledge. All these 
areas of application support the notion that a functional representation may be a fundamental 
element for the theory of technological change (Bonaccorsi 2011). 
Recently, we have applied it to an exercise of technology foresight in the biomedical industry, with 
surprising results (Apreda et al. 2013). After having built an appropriate functional representation 
for the technology, the dialogue between technologists and stakeholders became much more 
concrete and creative. The functional language offers a fully developed lingua franca to people who 
otherwise would not understand the language of the counterpart. Technologists would insist on the 
achievement of technical performance, while stakeholders would ask for the resolution of problems 
that are extremely urgent, but also ill-defined and vague. We suggest this problem will impair 
significantly any effort to guide research policy through the notion of societal challenges, as many 
governments, and more recently the European Commission, are prepared to do in the future. 
With respect to the issue of technological promises, the distinction between function and 
performance is crucial.  
As for the focus on functions, it is well known that a certain technology is generally characterized 
by performing a specific function, presumably in a better way than other existing technologies. So if 
the FMECA proves that the technology does not perform the “promised” functions, a potential and 
serious failure can be present. 
Clearly the boundary between function and performance is not sharp-cut and the two entities are 
intertwined. When there is no function the concept of performance is meaningless; on the other 
hand if the level of performance is too low no function can be fulfilled. Therefore we are not 
devaluing the importance of performances in the analysis. What we state is that failures in 
achieving performance do not necessarily mean that the promise is bound to be broken: further 
research may still lead to achieving the expected performance levels. However, if the functional 
promise is severely ill conceived, there is no way for the promise to be fulfilled, even with 
additional investment. Therefore the analysis of functions already embeds an assessment of the 
performances. Thus this constitutes one more reason to start from a functional perspective rather 
than from the other side of the chain. 
 
In this paper we extend the use of FA by showing how a systematic application of a negative 
version of it (i.e. the analysis of failures) may contribute to address technological promises. 
 
 
 
5. Address failures, not promises. Introducing a venerated engineering method in the 
policy making context 
 
 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is the main standardized methodology for failure 
analysis in industry. Its close relative Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was 
first developed by US military engineers and then adopted by NASA. In the seventies the 
automotive industry introduced FMEA as more suitable to the industrial context; later it spread to 
many other sectors and was further refined.  
FMEA is intended to: a) recognize and evaluate the potential failures of a product or a process and 
the effects of each failure; b) identify actions that can eliminate or reduce the chance of the potential 
failure occurring and c) document the entire process. 
We define a failure as the loss of an intended function of a product. Such loss can present itself in 
more than one realization, each called failure mode. To each failure mode it is possible to associate 
the failure causes, i.e. those defects in design or in realization that generated it, and the failure 
effects, i.e. its immediate consequences on the system. Of course there can be more than one cause 
and more than one effect. Failure cause, failure mode and failure effect are therefore linked by a 
causal relationship that is called the failure chain. 
Each failure mode, identified within the analysis, is studied by assessing three parameters: Severity 
(S), Non Detectability (ND) and Occurrence (O). The first quantifies the importance of the fault, the 
second its likelihood to be detected and therefore prevented or fixed, and the third the probability of 
the fault to actually happen.  
The values assigned to S, ND and O (ranging from 0 to 10) are then used to compute a Risk Priority 
Number (RPN) value expressing the gravity of the potential failure. The RPN is simply calculated 
by multiplying S, ND and O.  
Analyzing a product or a process with FMEA has two main goals in the present context: to study its 
uses and misuses, and to assess either its positive potential, either its likelihood to fail before or 
immediately after entering the market. 
 
The functional interpretation of a failure is rather straightforward: a failure is no more than either a 
desired function that is not performed as expected by the product, or an unforeseen and unwanted 
negative consequence. The negative connotation of the latter is clearly related to the human’s 
perspective and therefore can be called a function as well, though a harmful one. To sum up, from 
the point of view of FA a failure is either the negation of a positive function or a negative function. 
In this sense failure analysis is just the other, “darker” side of standard Functional Analysis. The 
two approaches actually strengthen each other and this fact underlines once more the power of FA 
as an interpretative and predictive tool: rather than costly learning by mistakes, once they have 
happened and it is often too late, a proper analysis of possible failures allows to prevent or fix them, 
avoiding false promises, disappointments, lack of use or commercial flop. 
While FMEA has been developed as a technique to be applied at the level of individual products, it 
is possible to extend the domain of analysis to entire product families, sometimes declined through 
different contexts of use. This extension is made possible by applying FA in order to identify higher 
level types of failures, that are associated not just to individual products, but to large classes of 
potential products. The specific failure modes, as well as their measurable parameters, will usually 
be different, depending on the design of individual products. 
In addition, while the application of FMEA to individual products results in the need for detailed 
plans to overcome failures through re-engineering and re-design, that is, activities that take place 
downstream in the development cycle, the application to broad technologies may result in re-
orientation of research activities. In this case the outcome of failure analysis is not necessarily to 
emit a definitive verdict on a technology, because there will normally be room for further 
development, but to direct the evolution towards a better satisfaction of user needs. 
In addition, we would like to extend even further the approach to include all aspects related to the 
product.  
Why not considering other phases as for example communication, advertising, reuse, recycle, and 
the like? For example a product can function perfectly during its useful life but be extremely 
polluting when disposed of. 
Our definition of failure is consequently broader than in standard FMEA, encompassing not just the 
situations when the product stops functioning properly during the phase of usage, but any and all 
negative or unwanted behaviors happening during any stage of the entire lifecycle of the product. 
Broadening the view even further, it is possible to investigate also the “failures” related to the wider 
market context, as for example changes in the demand, presence of cheaper alternatives and 
competitors, effects of government policies, etc. 
In the following we discuss four short examples to illustrate the impact of failures occurring in as 
much non-standard phases of the life cycle or market-related factors.  
 
Example 1. Electrical cars are expected to reduce carbon emissions and pollution. A main 
component of such vehicles is the battery. At the current state of the technology however, batteries 
create serious environmental problems both during the production and the disposal phases, due to 
the heavy metals they contain. Indeed a recent study showed that, considering the entire lifecycle of 
an electrical car, its ecologic balance is not favorable (Hawkins et al. 2013). 
 
Example 2. Rare earths permanent magnets are used in a variety of products in order to achieve 
higher performances. As of today, the most relevant applications are hybrid cars and wind turbines. 
However rare earths are now becoming too expensive (and their production is very polluting, too - 
another relevant failure considering that the main applications are in the green technology sector) 
(Alonso et al. 2012). The key point is that it is precisely the very success of such technology that 
has entailed a rise in price, due to the shortage and the concentration of rare earths in only one 
country. Therefore such failure in the supply chain could have been foreseen, at least in principle. 
The problem is becoming so important, also for its geopolitical implications, that the US 
government has launched a research program specifically to substitute the technology with new 
ones (program REACT - Rare Earth Alternatives in Critical Technologies). 
 
Example 3. Carbon nanotubes are considered a potentially revolutionary technology due to their 
outstanding technical performances. For instance, they may be used to produce very resistant and 
light mechanical frames, very efficient water purification filters or ultrafast computer chips.  
However they also present the risk of a potential big failure of non-technical nature, since many 
studies indicate they could cause cancer (e.g. Poland et al. 2008). 
 
Example 4. Sometimes the threat to health or environment does not even need to be a real one. As a 
foresight study we performed in 2010 has revealed, many Italian manufacturers hesitate to adopt 
basalt fiber in the textile industry, despite its good performances, because of the fear of a potential 
risk, given the analogy with asbestos fiber. Although basalt fibers measure on average two times the 
respiratory limit of 5 nanometers and should therefore be safe, research is not conclusive and above 
all the public opinion is still suspicious; hence, as an entrepreneur said: “nobody wants to be 
associated to the new asbestos”. In this case the failure is not in the product itself, but in something 
quite intangible as the perception that the technology induce in the user or, as in the above case, in 
the producers themselves, that do not want to run the risk of a market fiasco. 
The idea of combining function and failure analysis is relatively recent, but various research works 
have already been undertaken. Nagel et al. (2009) propose a process analysis to investigate the 
propagation of faults that can compromise the successful usage of a product; Hutcheson et al. 
(2006) define a method for studying the critical sequences of events that can occur in a complex 
system; Del Frate (2011) presents a life cycle approach to product failures that extends FMEA to 
manufacturing, maintenance and retirement.  
While such contributions offer various extensions to the classical use of FMEA, the idea to apply it 
to technological promises, considering the entire product lifecycle, and to adopt it as a tool for 
innovation policy is, to the best of our knowledge, pretty new. 
 
 
6. Applying failure analysis to technological promises.  
 
6.1  A structured approach to failures 
 
As already mentioned, the technology foresight method proposed here relies on FA, which is used 
first to map the product functioning and then to perform a FMEA. Figure 1 represents the sequence 
of steps for its application. 
 
Figure 1 should ideally go here 
 
For any given product, the first step is the life cycle analysis that identifies the various stages of its 
life, from the gathering of raw materials to disposal. At a second, further level of detail each stage is 
subdivided into phases (for example the disposal stage implies collection, transport and proper 
disposal or recycle). In the third step, each phase is realized through one or more functions. The 
output of these first steps is then a full-scale functional map, associated to a rich textual description. 
The next step identifies all the potential failure modes in order to assess the more critical ones 
(process FMEA). As discussed, a failure can be considered as (i) the real lack of capacity to 
perform a certain action, or (ii) the presumed/perceived inability to perform it. 
The FMEA then proceeds taking into account for each failure its effects (thus setting a numerical 
value for the Severity parameter), its causes (thus defining a value for the Occurrence parameter) 
and the current controls that can detect the failure (thus assessing the Non Detection parameter). 
The consequent RPN permits to prioritize the failure modes and to devise actions to improve the 
product.  
This investigation allows also mapping the failure sequence in terms of cause-effect relationships: a 
failure cause can be considered directly responsible for a failure mode and a failure mode for a 
failure effect. The existence of such causal chains can generate dangerous domino effects, negating 
too many useful functions. 
A main characteristic of the FMEA is its bottom-up nature: it provides failure description at 
different levels of detail (e.g. the failure of a system can be represented as being caused by the 
failure of its subsystems and so on), and enables a temporal/causal study of what happens before 
and after a certain failure sequence. 
 
6.2  A case study in the textile industry 
 
The method described has been applied to the analysis of the textile industry, a large low-medium 
tech sector that is meeting considerable problems in Europe. The study was conducted in 2010, in 
the context of a Technology Foresight exercise, covering also a high technology sector (biomedical 
engineering), commissioned by the Regional authority in Tuscany, Italy. 
The study was multi-sided and touched different aspects of the sector, from the evolution of the 
logistic chain to environmental issues, and used traditional methods of analysis, such as expert 
panels or consensus building, as well. However, since of the many claims made by interested 
parties to leverage public support, that new fibers or materials could greatly contribute to restore the 
competitiveness of the Tuscan textile industry, we were authorized to apply FMEA to test some of 
these technological promises. In the same exercise we also experimented new methods for 
technology foresight from patent analysis, for which we refer to Apreda et al. (2013). 
 
First, we gathered information from experts and by processing industry publications, newsletters, 
websites etc. This activity led to the selection of a list of products and technologies, considered 
most innovative or at least very promising for the textile industry. We then performed both 
functional decomposition and failure analysis for each one of them. 
We illustrate the method using as an example a recent technology where a network of optical fibers 
is embedded in fabrics. Luminosity is generated by integrated electronics supplied by an electric 
battery. Such technology allows creating a family of textile products that can emit their own light, 
with application both in interior design and in clothing. 
This class of products received lot of media coverage and generous R&D funding, so it can be 
considered a good example of a technological promise.  
At the time of the analysis, the technology had few applications and the first one was a jacket; 
market data were preliminary and did not allow any projection on the success of the family of 
products. 
We chose the jacket as an example of the methodology, valid for the whole range. The first step is 
to identify all the functions performed by the jacket, starting from the various phases that occur 
during the use of the product (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 should ideally go here 
 
Among the main functions there are the capability to allow the passage of air and sweat or to allow 
the movement of the user. 
In addition to these functionalities that all clothes should have, the peculiarity of this jacket is to 
export a luminous signal towards the external environment. 
The first six functions in Figure 2 can therefore be considered the primary functions, because they 
are connected to the reason why the user buys that particular jacket. The jacket performs them in an 
“active” way. Functions from 7 to 9 concern instead the ordinary maintenance of the jacket, 
washing, drying and ironing, and are performed on the jacket rather than by it. Functions occurring 
during the maintenance phase can have an impact on the functions occurring during the next phase 
of usage/wearing. 
To sum up, what the product needs to do is to emit light and adapt to the shape of the human body, 
plus other auxiliary functions. Failing to deliver any of those tasks compromises its success. 
A list of possible failures can be associated to “active” functions and can be represented simply in 
the form “not+functional verb+object”.  
Each failure can be connected to a failure mode describing the way in which it can occur (Figure 3). 
For example, the failure not allow flow of air is associated to the failure mode flow of air blocked.  
In the same way, the failure modes are generated by the failure causes, which are the origin of the 
problems. Continuing with the example, the failure mode flow of air blocked is generated by the 
cause optical fibers are joined to the jacket through glue, because the glue makes the jacket non 
breathable. 
One failure can be linked to more than one failure modes (Figure 3), because there can be several 
ways to realize the same failure. Likewise one failure mode can be caused by more than one failure 
causes.  
For example the effect not export signal may occur either because different points of light emerge, 
or because the jacket reduces its light in time. In turn, the first failure mode, due to the breaking of 
fibers, can be generated either by wearing or during washing. 
Finally, in Figure 3 the expression “breaking of fibers” appears several times, followed by different 
numbers. The number distinguishes between the possible ways in which the fibers can break. 
Figure 3 should ideally go here 
The following step is the assessment of Severity, Occurrence and Detection by the technicians. The 
resulting RPN indicates the criticality of each failure (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 should ideally go here 
 
For example the failure cause “the stiffness of the glass reduces the flexibility” presents the highest 
value of RPN. This failure cause is associated to the essential function that a jacket should follow 
the movement of the body (“to adapt”).  
As a consequence of the many critical failures, the technological promise underlying the 
development of light emitting clothes presented serious drawbacks, at least in the existing 
realization of the technology. This was clearly no good news to the Regional government, but was 
received as an important lesson for the future. 
  
Is this result relevant only at the level of individual products, or does it extend to the entire 
technology? Here we can see the power of the methodology. The failures identified above carry 
over to all existing textile applications of optical fibers. The same conclusions can be derived at a 
higher level of generality by studying physical properties of optical fibers and controlling whether 
they can deliver the desired functions. 
The use of the entire technology in the textile industry can be justified because of its typical 
functions that are "to adapt" to surfaces of different shapes and "to emit" light. If it does not 
perform these characteristic functionalities obviously the technology loses most of its value for that 
family of applications. In the case study we have discussed only one product, but the same analysis 
is applicable to all other analogous artifacts, since they all present the same problems. For example 
in a curtain the flexibility may be less important than in a T-shirt but during the washing phase it 
remains an important feature. The particular failure detected on a specific product may be less 
relevant for another product but a complete analysis of the technology failures can lead to identify 
the weak points of each product in that range, since they are often strictly connected. 
For what concerns the relationship between functions and performances, it is true that sometimes 
the fulfillment of a function is hindered by a low performance. However, an incremental 
improvement of performance will hardly solve a big failure (its "gravity" is highlighted by the RPN 
value) related to the total absence of a promised function. On the other hand, if the change in 
performance is truly radical so that it will deliver a new function, actually it probably implies a 
totally different and innovative technical solution as well; therefore a new technology is created 
altogether. Referring to the case study, the optical fiber is made of glass but a very flexible glass 
does not exist. If an alternative optical fiber would be found, it will definitely be a new technology, 
with many useful applications beyond the textile industry. 
Of course, this is not necessarily the conclusion of the analysis, since in other cases it may well be 
that the current product is bound to fail, while other developments of the underlying technology 
could do better. Using FMEA, decision makers are in a better position to decide whether the risk 
profile of the technology is worth the effort. Considering the broader product-user-market system, 
and applying FA, decision makers may take risks in a more informed way. More importantly, they 
do not fail victim of the fascination of technological promises. On the other hand, if technologies 
pass the test of FMEA, they largely gain in credibility. Applying FMEA to technological promises 
is a win-win game, in which decision makers gain in robustness of decisions, and technologists gain 
in legitimation. 
 
In the technology foresight described above it was possible to classify a large number of emerging 
technologies in the textile industry in two categories:  
• Low risk, when RPN values were low for all the failure modes of the product; 
• High risk, for products characterized by high RPN values, at least in some important 
function-failure relationship. 
In the first class there are the emerging products and technologies presenting few problems and 
which are potentially successful on the market. Therefore it should be desirable for the Regional 
government to invest in them, helping when possible the reorganization of declining segments of 
the textile industry towards the more profitable new directions. 
In the second class there are the products or technologies that present one or more severe 
criticalities, either of technical nature or in the wider context of their introduction into the market, 
which can affect negatively their success. Therefore the government should either not invest on 
them or, if a certain product presents nevertheless desirable benefits, support further research in 
order to improve it. In certain cases it can also be a sensible strategy to look for different sectors of 
application for the technology, maybe by exploiting its ability to perform functions different from 
the original one.    
7. Implications and policy lessons  
 
The application of FA and FMEA to technology foresight looks promising. We have suggested two 
important departures from existing methods. First, address functions, not only performance. This 
requires that technological promises are not discussed at face value, focusing on the presumed 
expected results that may solve societal issues at some point in the future. Rather, it is important to 
build up functional representations of the proposed technology and to open a dialogue between 
technologists and stakeholders that take place within this representation. Sharing a common 
language is extremely powerful in order to establish shared visions of the future. Second, address 
failures, not promises. We suggest that failure analysis is applied systematically in all cases where 
there are technological promises, or when there is conflict over a technology. It might even become 
a standard policy tool, for example by requiring that it is carried out in proposals submitted for 
research funding. For a technological promise, it must become a reference the fact that it has been 
submitted to a structured FMEA and has survived! 
Two objections to our methodology can be raised. On one hand, one may wonder whether our 
approach requires that the product is already instantiated, so that technologies in their early stage 
cannot be examined. It is true that, traditionally FMEA is mostly associated to existing products, 
but FA and FMEA can be applied successfully at any level of development of a technology, even in 
the conceptual stage. Of course it has to be possible to provide at least an abstract description of the 
functioning of a certain technology or product. If a product is just a vague idea without a series of 
conceptual steps to implement it, no FMEA is possible, but we are dealing with a wish rather than 
with a real technological potential. On the other hand, one may be worried about the costs of such 
methodologies, but newly developed functional databases allow a relatively fast learning and 
application. 
We believe that future S&T policies, aimed at creating strong connections between research and the 
resolution of societal challenges, will greatly benefit from a large scale application of such 
approach.  
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